POLAND CONFIRMED — OLEG BOYKO, THE OWNER OF TRADEWIN24,
LINKED TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE!
Poland’s Minister of the Interior rejected Boyko’s personal request to be removed from sanctions. Reason: classified data from the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Financial Supervision Commission. The same company through which Boyko controls TradeWin24 was identified as an instrument for concealing Russian capital.
Illustration: Oleg Boyko
After we revealed in our previous article that behind the takeover of the TradeWin24 brokerage stands sanctioned Russian tycoon Oleg Boyko, hiding behind a chain of offshore companies and family members in violation of the laws of the Republic of Serbia, new exclusive information gathered by our investigative team shows that the story goes much deeper than even we had initially assumed.
As soon as our article was published, a rush followed: TradeWin24’s management, led by Nikola Maksimović — whom our sources describe as Oleg Boyko’s chief of special financial operations in Serbia — began rapidly changing company headquarters and shifting ownership records in registries, clearly attempting to cover up who the true owner of TradeWin24 really is (which we will address in the next article). This behavior only confirms the pattern surrounding this company from the very beginning — from the manipulations and collapse of Sinteza Invest Group and its rebranding into TradeWin24, all the way to today.
Our portal now exclusively publishes insight into the official decision of the Polish Ministry of the Interior rejecting Oleg Boyko’s personal request to be removed from the sanctions list. Documentation from the ABW (Poland’s Internal Security Agency) exposes the TradeWin24 owner’s ties to Russian intelligence structures and the international criminal underworld — ties the Polish state was unwilling to ignore even after Boyko’s personal intervention and the engagement of legal counsel.
In the wave of scandals and controversies surrounding in recent months the takeover of the TradeWin24 brokerage by the sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Boyko, more and more information confirms the suspicion that the acquisition violated the laws of the Republic of Serbia, primarily the Capital Market Law, which clearly defines reputation as one of the most important conditions for acquiring the status of a qualified investor and proposed acquirer.
As we have already warned, in the heart of Belgrade a scandal of shocking proportions is unfolding, and only now is its true face coming into public view.
1. June 2025: Boyko personally asked — Poland told him no
□ Download the original decision of the Polish Ministry of the Interior (PDF) →
On April 18, 2025, Oleg Boyko, represented by attorney Michał Jabłoński, submitted an official request to the Minister of the Interior and Administration of the Republic of Poland seeking removal from the Polish sanctions list. On June 23, 2025, a decision was issued under reference number DPP-WTPZ.0272.27.2025(27). The request was rejected in full.
▌ Ministry of the Interior of Poland — Decision DPP-WTPZ.0272.27.2025(27), June 23, 2025. [original gov.pl →]
"Odmawiam uwzględnienia wniosku [...] Olega BOJKO (Oleg BOYKO) dotyczącego wykreślenia z listy." [I reject Oleg BOYKO’s request to be removed from the sanctions list.]
2. What the security service said: organized crime and Russian intelligence operations
The sanctions were not imposed by journalists or NGOs. The initiative came from the Polish Internal Security Agency — ABW, the equivalent of the FBI or MI5. When Boyko asked to be removed from the list, ABW was consulted again — and it fully reaffirmed the original assessment in a new classified document.
▌ Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) — cited in ministerial decision, December 2024.
"The oligarch has ties to criminal organizations and Russian intelligence services. Casinos under Boyko’s control may serve to legalize financial assets stemming from organized crime and Russian intelligence operations."
The Polish ministry states in its decision that Boyko is a Russian billionaire, owner of Finstar Financial Group, and a man who for years ranked among the wealthiest Russians, with business interests in short-term lending, real estate, and gambling. But the key part is not his wealth — it is what the state says it knows about the background of that wealth: the decision states that there is information linking Boyko to organized crime and Russian intelligence services.
Poland did not reject Boyko’s request because it disliked his passport or the origin of his capital, but because the reasoning effectively describes him as a man positioned at the dangerous intersection of Russia’s political-security environment, financial interests, and the criminal underworld. The ministry also states that information about his ties to Russian “power ministries” and Russian-speaking organized crime indicates that Boyko has for years maintained contacts with structures under the strict control of Russian special services. It further notes his operation in an environment of individuals clearly identified as associates of Russian special services.
The ministry openly acknowledges that part of the reasoning is not published in full because it relies on classified and confidential ABW information. In other words, what the public received in the published decision is only a limited part of the picture. Even that “limited” part, however, is enough to show how serious the risk perception attached by the Polish state to Boyko truly is. The authority states that in May 2025 it received additional confidential information from ABW, and that it only strengthened the earlier conclusion that there were no grounds for removing Boyko from the list.
3. Financial regulator: ownership changes were concealment, not withdrawal
In addition to ABW, the Polish Financial Supervision Commission (KNF) conducted its own analysis of Boyko’s ownership structures. KNF concluded that the ownership changes were intended to conceal ties to Russian capital — not to represent a genuine withdrawal. KNF emphasized in particular that the same individuals remained in management structures as during the period when Boyko was openly present as the owner.
▌ Polish Financial Supervision Commission (KNF) — cited in ministerial decision, 2024.
"The ownership changes were intended to conceal links to Russian capital, rather than to represent the real withdrawal of the Russian side from the business and the transfer of control over those entities."
Even more damaging for Boyko is the section of the decision relating to 4Finance. The ministry openly states that in deciding the case it had extensive materials concerning his links to entities from the 4Finance group, and reminds that on the same day Boyko was sanctioned, 4Finance AS of Latvia was also placed on the list. The decision itself cites wording that AS 4Finance remains under the indirect management of the Russian oligarch Oleg Boyko, who is at the same time described as the informal ultimate beneficiary of the financial proceeds generated by the entire group. This is not a side remark. It is the central conclusion of the Polish state: formal changes on paper mean nothing if actual control and benefit remain in the same hands.
In other words, Poland did not believe the story that Boyko had withdrawn. On the contrary, it decided not to trust him. The document shows that both ABW and KNF took the position that even after changes in the shareholding structure, there remained grounds to regard the 4Finance network as still connected to Boyko and Russian capital. KNF, as cited in the decision, assessed that the composition of management structures and the continuity of personnel within the system may indicate that the ownership changes were in fact intended to conceal Russian links, rather than to reflect a real exit from the business.
The decision goes even further into broader corporate terrain. The ministry recalls that in April 2025, Aurasol AG of Switzerland and 4Finance Holding S.A. of Luxembourg were also sanctioned as entities connected to Boyko’s network. Particularly striking is the section describing assignments of claims and transfers of rights between Latvian, Luxembourg, and Swiss firms around the time sanctions were introduced. According to the cited ABW view, such actions may indicate manipulation of documentation dates and the instrumental use of the Swiss entity in order to avoid the attention of Polish services toward capital and companies connected to Boyko. This is no longer merely a question of reputation; it is a description of conduct that the state is clearly treating as an attempt to conceal the trail of control and money.
That line becomes even stronger when the ministry turns to other related entities. The decision also describes the case of Bastorehill Investments, noting a chain of ownership through Tirona Limited, 4Finance Group, and 4Finance AS, all the way to a Polish company. The authority emphasizes that it was able to reconstruct this structure even from public registries, while KNF assessed that the recorded beneficial owners did not provide sufficient guarantees that Russian capital had truly disappeared from the background of the business. In plain terms: Poland did not look only at the formal owner — it sought the real center of control, and it did not find it sufficiently distant from Boyko.
3b. Tirona Ltd — the same company, two scandals
The Polish ministerial decision explicitly names Tirona Limited (Cyprus) as the key node connecting Boyko with the 4Finance group. That is the same Tirona Ltd that sits at the top of the TradeWin24 ownership chain:
Oleg Boyko → Tirona Ltd (Cyprus) → Ficron Finance Ltd (Cyprus) → Star Finance AD (Serbia) → TradeWin24
⚠ The company identified as an instrument for concealing Russian capital is the very same company through which Boyko controls TradeWin24 in Serbia.
4. Timeline: Boyko versus the world
2017 — US Senate: “Troubling ties to the Russian government, security services, and organized crime.”
April 2022 — Australia: Sanctions. Boyko remains on the list today.
November 2022 — Canada: Sanctions.
October 2022 — Ukraine: Sanctions. Still active today.
December 2024 — Poland: Sanctions imposed at the request of ABW and KNF. Asset freeze.
April 2025 -- Boyko’s lawyer requests removal from the Polish list.
April 2025 -- While Boyko awaits a response, Poland imposes new sanctions on two more of his companies: Aurasol AG and 4Finance Holding S.A.
June 2025 -- Poland formally rejects the request. ABW confirms: the sanctions are fully justified.
5. And Serbia? TradeWin24 is still operating
At the moment you are reading this article, TradeWin24 continues to operate on Serbia’s capital market and continues to receive client funds — despite the fact that the Serbian Capital Market Law, Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 135 explicitly provides that a person who has been subject to foreign sanctions within the last ten years cannot be an owner of an investment firm in Serbia.
⚠ The Securities Commission of the Republic of Serbia has the legal authority and obligation to examine this situation. Every day without an answer is a day in which Serbian investors place money into a company owned by a sanctioned oligarch.
6. Conclusion
● Oleg Boyko is the real owner of TradeWin24 through Tirona Ltd (Cyprus).
● Tirona Ltd was identified by Poland’s KNF as an instrument for concealing Russian capital.
● ABW formally concluded that Boyko has ties to organized crime and Russian intelligence services.
● Boyko is sanctioned by Australia, Ukraine, and Poland. He appears on the US Treasury’s Putin list.
● He personally requested removal from the Polish list — and received a formal NO.
● Serbian law explicitly prohibits such a person from owning an investment firm.
● TradeWin24 is still operating in Serbia.
There are official documents. There is a law. There is a failure.
The only question is: how long?
Sources and documentation:
Polish Ministry of the Interior — Decision DPP-WTPZ.0272.27.2025(27), June 23, 2025. [gov.pl]
ABW (Polish Internal Security Agency) — request R-0-10478/2024
KNF (Polish Financial Supervision Commission) — request DMLDMLZKN.071.6.2024.MT
US Senate Intelligence Committee Report — 2017.
OpenSanctions.org — Oleg Boyko profile
DFAT Australia — consolidated sanctions list
Decree of the President of Ukraine 727/2022
Serbian Capital Market Law — Official Gazette of the RS no. 129/2021 and 109/2025, Art. 2, para. 1, item 135.
— Published in the public interest --